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TERM OF THE COURT

COMMERCIAL LAW
I.

CONTRACT FORMATION

A. Intent
In the case of Household Utilities,Inc. v. Andrews Co., ' the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the requisites of contract
formation. The defendant was a contractor which had been
awarded a contract for the construction of a heating facility. In
drafting its bid, Andrews had included figures from the plaintiff's subcontracting bid. After Andrews was awarded the contract, it informed Household that the latter had been the low
bidder for the subcontracted portion of the project. There followed considerable correspondence between the parties relating to the project,2 including a request made by Household to
Andrews for the issuance of a purchase order. Household was
thereupon sent a photocopy of a purchase order which described the work to be done, listed the bidded price, and was
signed by the head of Andrews's heating department.
Subsequently, Household informed Andrews that its subcontracting costs would be more than the amount of the original bid, and the bid was changed accordingly. However, by
April 1972, Andrews had sold its heating department and was
evincing a desire to assign the contract for the project. Moreover, Andrews informed Household that it would not honor
commitments made regarding the project.
Household had ordered various materials for the project by
this time and commenced suit against Andrews to recover the
costs thereof. The case was tried without a jury and the trial
court held, at the close of the plaintiff's case, that "there had
been no meeting of the minds on the contract as evidenced by
1. 71 Wis. 2d 17, 236 N.W.2d 663 (1976).
2. A time table of this correspondence would appear as follows:
Dec. 9, 1971: Household submits its subcontracting bid to Andrews.
Dec. 20, 1971: Andrews is informed that its contracting bid has been accepted;
it in turn notifies Household of its acceptance of the latter's subcontracting bid.
Dec. 22, 1971: Household's manager sends written confirmation of the bid to
Andrews.
Dec. 27, 1971: Andrews requests clarification of the bid from Household.
Dec. 31, 1971: Household sends clarifying information.
Jan. 1972: Household requests purchase order from Andrews.
Id. at 18-19, 236 N.W.2d at 664.
3. The issuance of a purchase order is a common method by which subcontractors
are hired by contractors.
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. . a letter from the plaintiff to the defendant, in which the
plaintiffs requested a new purchase order . . . to correct an
error." 4 The defendant moved for and was granted a nonsuit.
On appeal, the court reiterated several basic rules of contract law. First, the burden of establishing the existence of a
contract is on the person attempting to recover for its breach.'
To do this, he must show that there was a meeting of the minds
between the parties. Thus, the second rule is that "[t]here is
no meeting of the minds where the parties do not intend to
contract and the question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact." 6 The trier of fact is to determine
the intent of the parties by considering their words, both oral
and written, and their actions.
The court affirmed the holding of the trial court, pointing
to the correspondence between the parties as support of the
trial court's conclusion that there was never any reasonable
certainty with respect to the basic terms and conditions of the
alleged contract.7 If the words and actions of the parties evince
uncertainty and inconclusiveness with regard to material terms
of the contract, the proponent of the contract has failed to meet
its burden, and no contract will be found.
The intent of the parties to a contract was also at issue in
Peterson v. Schrieber.8 The plaintiff in this case contracted
with the defendant for the construction of a prefabricated
building. The parties agreed that the defendant would supervise construction, lay a concrete floor, and erect the building.
This contract was formed in June, and partial payment was
made to the defendant in July. Also in July, the plaintiff
brought in fill to grade the site properly. However, the defendant was not available to supervise the preparations, and it was
not until October that the defendant arranged for the foundation to be laid by a third party.
In October, Schrieber obtained a performance bond from
Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland. Further difficulties plagued the construction until Peterson finally terminated
the contract and made other arrangements for construction in
December.
*

4. 71 Wis. 2d 23, 236 N.W.2d at 666.
5. Id. at 28-29, 236 N.W.2d at 669.
6. Id. at 29, 236 N.W.2d at 669.
7. Id. at 30, 236 N.W.2d at 670.
8. 71 Wis. 2d 498, 238 N.W.2d 722 (1976).
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At the trial, the court found that Schrieber had breached
the terms of the contract by its failure of performance both
prior and subsequent to obtaining the performance bond from
Fidelity. The trial court therefore entered judgment for the
plaintiff for damages arising throughout the life of the contract. 9
The intent of the parties to the surety contract was at issue
on appeal. The supreme court followed the rule that "a contract of suretyship is not retrospective in its application and
that no liability attaches to the surety for defaults occurring
prior to the date of execution of the performance bond."'" Finding no evidence in the record to indicate that Fidelity had any
knowledge of Schrieber's defaults or near defaults at the time
of the bond's issuance, and thus no intent to assume the liability for such breaches, the court concluded that the surety could
not be held liable for damages arising prior to that date." However, the court concurred with the trial court that the breaches
giving rise to damages to which Fidelity was being held liable
occurred after the bond's issuance, and affirmed the decision.
The case of Titus v. Polan2 involved a merchant's small
claims action for the price of a submersible pump Miotor. In
November 1973, the plaintiff sold a submersible pump to the
defendant. When the pump motor failed the following August,
the defendant called the plaintiff to have it repaired. The
plaintiff, upon inspecting the pump, concluded that a manufacturing defect existed, replaced the pump motor and returned the original motor to the distributor. The defendant was
not billed for the replacement motor until the distributor declined to honor the warranty.
The evidence introduced at the trial indicated that the
pump motor was designed to be operated at 220 volts. The
testimony of the plaintiff and the defendant conflicted as to the
9. The trial court entered judgment against Schrieber and Fidelity for $13,382.36,
$7,645.44 of which represented the plaintiff's liability to the third party who had
actually laid the concrete flooring. The remainder reflected damages suffered by the
plaintiff in securing a replacement building. The trial court also entered judgment
against Schrieber alone for payments made to the defendant at the contract's inception. Id. at 501, 238 N.W.2d at 724.
10. Id.
11. The court likened surety bonds to insurance contracts, and cited Reed v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 244 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1957) for the proposition that, "for practical
purposes these suretyship contracts are much like contracts of insurance, whereby the
insurer will assume the risk only of future occurrences but not of past and established
ones." Id. at 502, 238 N.W.2d at 724.25.
12. 72 Wis. 2d 23, 240 N.W.2d 420 (1976).
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voltage at which the motor was actually operated, but it was
established that a motor designed for high voltage would operate for only a short period of time at a lower voltage. In this
13
instance, the motor was operated for seven months.
Based upon the fact that the defendant requested the repair
of the motor and upon other circumstances surrounding the
transaction, the trial court concluded that an agreement to pay
for the new motor had been made by the defendant, that the
plaintiff had given no warranty as to the performance of the
original motor, and granted judgment to the plaintiff.
The supreme court reversed on appeal, finding that no
express contract to pay for the replacement motor had been
proven by the plaintiff." The court also declined to find an
implied agreement to pay for the replacement motor. Citing
the recent case of Hicks v. Milwaukee County 5 for the proposition that recovery in quasi-contract is allowed when the plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant and when it would
be inequitable to allow the defendant to retain the benefit
without paying for it, the court concluded that the circumstances surrounding this transaction did not support a conclusion
that it would be inequitable to allow this defendant to retain
the benefit of the replacement motor.
This conclusion was reached by the court's application of
the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Citing section 402.314 of the Wisconsin Statutes," which implies
a warranty of fitness for the ordinary purpose for which the
goods are used, and pointing to the plaintiff's failure to show
13. Id. at 24, 240 N.W.2d at 421.
14. While the court indicated that the defendant's request of the plaintiff to service
the motor was relevant to the question of an agreement to pay, the court concluded
that this fact alone did not require such a finding in light of the plaintiff's failure to
bill the defendant for the motor and installation charges until the distributor declined
to honor the manufacturer's warranty. Moreover, the court noted that no testimony
was introduced to show that the defendant was informed of the problem with the motor
and had agreed to pay for its replacement. Id. at 25, 240 N.W.2d at 421-22.
15. 71 Wis. 2d 401, 404, 238 N.W.2d 509, 512 (1976).
16. Wis. STAT. § 402.314 (1973) provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified. . . a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
(c)

Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
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that such warranty was excluded or modified, the court concluded that the existence of this statutory warranty precluded
a finding of inequity in allowing the defendant to retain the
benefit of the replacement motor.
B. Consideration
In Estate of Mingesz, 7 the court considered the sufficiency
of evidence to establish a guaranty contract. Here, Richard
Mingesz signed a statement which guaranteed the payment of
a note executed nine months previously.'" The note was payable in full in September 1969. Mingesz died in November
1970, and the payee of the note subsequently filed a claim
against his estate for the full amount of the note plus interest.
The first defense raised by the guarantor's estate was that
no consideration had been given to Mingesz. Testimony of the
attorney who drafted the document indicated that no pecuniary consideration passed to Mingesz at the signing." However,
the court, citing a century-old Wisconsin case2' for the proposition that the recitation of consideration received in a guaranty
is sufficient to raise the presumption that consideration was
given in fact, found this testimony insufficient to rebut the
presumption.'
The estate also argued that the failure of the creditor to give
notice to the guarantor of its acceptance of the guaranty absolved the guarantor of liability. The court rejected this argument, holding that "notice of acceptance is not required where
the guaranty is an unconditional agreement to pay a fixed,
previously incurred debt."22 Here, the guarantor knew precisely
the full amount due on the note and the extent of his liability
when the guaranty was executed. There was no doubt that
Mingesz intended to guaranty that amount.?
17. 70 Wis. 2d 734, 235 N.W.2d 296 (1975).
18. The statement signed by Mingesz read as follows:
For value received, I, the undersigned, guarantee the payment of the above
described note in full and if after the maturity of this note the maker does not
pay the full principal and interest then due and owing thereon, the undersigned
will, on demand of the holder hereof, pay the holder any and all sums then due
and owing.
Id. at 736, 335 N.W.2d at 297 (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Yenner v. Hammond, 36 Wis. 277, 280-81 (1874).
21. 70 Wis. 2d at 741, 235 N.W.2d at 300.
22. Id.
23. The court distinguished the case of Miami County National Bank v. Goldberg,
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II. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A. Time of the Essence Provisions
The court was called upon to determine if time was of the
essence to a mortgage loan commitment in Gonis v. New York
Life Insurance Co. 4 The plaintiff, seeking refinancing of a
shopping center, accepted a commitment for a mortgage loan
from the defendant. The closing date was set for April 15, 1972.
In the two months between the acceptance of the commitment
and the projected closing date, much correspondence passed
between the parties in their efforts to fulfill the conditions precedent to the loan. 2 When the date of closing neared, however,
the plaintiff suggested that it be extended. No response to this
suggestion was made by the lender before the closing date, nor
was the closing held at the scheduled time. The plaintiff thereupon rescinded and brought suit for money paid to the defendant as an application and processing fee and security deposit.
The court looked to both the terms of the contract and the
actions of the parties to determine that time was of the essence.
Although the contract did not state that time was of the essence,'2 it provided that $26,000 in liquidated damages were to
be paid to the lender if it did not receive the loan on or before
the expiration of the commitment, that the lender's obligations
133 Wis. 175, 113 N.W. 391 (1907) from the instant case by reason that, in the former,
where the court had held the guarantor entitled to notice of acceptance as a condition
precedent to his liability, a guaranty of future, and thus not fixed, liability was involved. This distinction, and the conclusion of the court in the instant case, seems in
agreement with the court's decision in Peterson v. Schrieber, 71 Wis. 2d 498, 238
N.W.2d 722 (1975), wherein the court concluded that a surety could not be held liable
on a bond for breaches of the principal contract which occurred prior to the bond's
issuance, and of which the surety had no knowledge or intent to insure. See text
accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
24. 70 Wis. 2d 950, 236 N.W.2d 273 (1975).
25. The financing was conditional upon the borrower's providing the lender with
tenant's acceptance and estoppel letters, assignments of the lessor's interests, a survey
of the premises and a title report, proof that adequate hazard insurance policies had
been obtained, and various other certifications by the borrower. The correspondence
between the parties during this time, however, centered basically around the sufficiency of the survey and the title report. Id. at 952-53, 236 N.W.2d at 274-75.
26. The lender argued that the absence of any oral or written agreement making
time of the essence was a factor to be weighted heavily against a finding that it was
essential. The court disagreed, and stated that the lack of such an agreement "does
not preclude evaluating the circumstances arising from the acts of the parties as to
whether time was, in fact, considered by them to be of the essence." Id. at 956, 236
N.W.2d at 276.
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under the commitment ceased after the day of the closing, and
that any extension of this date was in the sole discretion of the
lender and was to be made only in writing.Y If only because of
the possibility of losing the liquidated damages, time appeared
to be of the essence. Moreover, the failure of the lender to
respond to the borrower's suggestion that the closing date be
extended prompted the court to affirm the trial court's conclusion that such nonaction was indicative of the parties' belief
that time was in fact of the essence to the financing. Silence
by the lender to this suggestion, in view of the various provito indicate to the
sions of the commitment, would hardly seem
28
borrower that time was not of the essence.
Finding that time was of the essence to the commitment
agreement, the court then held that the borrower had not
breached the contract by failing to meet its conditions precedent. The trial court had found that the "conditions.

.

.could

have been completed within the time limitations of the original
application closing date. ' '29 The court agreed and stated that

the failure of the borrower to fulfill the conditions prior to the
time of closing did not constitute a breach of the commitment
absent a showing that such conditions would not have been met
had the closing been held as planned:
Viewing the duties listed as conditions precedent, we agree
with the trial court that, where the respondent could have
fulfilled the conditions by or on the original closing date, his
not having done so earlier is not controlling where a closing
was not attempted on the closing date, or such closing date
was extended."0
27. Id. at 955-56, 236 N.W.2d at 276.
28. Id. at 956-57, 236 N.W.2d at 276.
29. Id. at 958, 236 N.W.2d at 277.
30. Id. at 960, 236 N.W.2d at 278 (footnotes omitted). It is interesting to note that
with respect to the obtaining of hazard insurance, the cburt recognized the common
practice of using funds derived from the lender to pay the premiums thereof. To this
effect, the court cited 6 S. WILLISTON, CONrACTS, § 881 at 387-88 (3d ed. 1976):
A mortgage can be drawn from the buyer to the lender before the land is conveyed; then if the buyer and seller and lender meet at the same place, the seller
can be paid his money while simultaneously he delivers a deed to the buyer, and
the buyer delivers a mortgage to the lender. In the same way, if the buyer's
money is needed to free the title which the seller must offer, a simultaneous
execution of the transaction is possible if the person holding the title or encumbrance is willing to aid the seller in carrying out the bargain, and this should
be sufficient.
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Thus, because time was found to be of the essence to the agreement, and because the date of closing had passed without a
breach of its terms on the part of the borrower, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that the borrower was entitled
to rescind the agreement.
B. Mortgage Interest Escalator Clauses
The court was twice called upon to determine the validity
of a mortgage interest rate escalator clause this term. In the
first case, Security Savings & Loan Association v. Wauwatosa
Colony,"' the court validated escalation clauses in mortgage
agreements with Wisconsin savings and loan associations and
further held that such provisions could be exercised more than
once. In the second case, Kaski v. FirstFederalSavings & Loan
Association,32 the court invalidated an interest escalation
clause in a mortgage given a federal savings and loan association but only because the lower court's determination was not
made pursuant to federal law. Nevertheless, the two cases together demonstrate the court's adherence to the principal that
mortgage escalation clauses are valid under certain circumstances.
In Wauwatosa Colony, the defendant, who was engaged in
the real estate business, executed a mortgage note to the plaintiff in July 1962. One portion of this note provided:
The rate of interests stipulated herein may be increased
at the option of the Association; provided, however, that the
Association may not exercise such right in less than 3 years
from the date of the loan, and then only upon at least four
month's written notice to the borrower; and provided that in
the event of such an increase in the stipulated rate of interest
the borrower may prepay the loan within such notice period
without penalty.33
Thereafter, the Association increased the rate of interest on the
note by two percent in June 1968, and by an additional one
Thus, the court appears to support a practical definition of the term "condition precedent" and not a strict theoretical application. But however practical this approach may
be, the person relying upon the fulfillment of the conditions precedent to his obligation
to perform should be assured beforehand that they will have been satisfied by the time
this simultaneous transaction is completed. Moreover, simultaneous should be construed to mean a short period of time.
31. 71 Wis. 2d 174, 237 N.W.2d 729 (1976).
32. 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240 N.W.2d 367 (1976).
33. 71 Wis. 2d at 176, 237 N.W.2d at 730.
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percent in May 1970.11 On February 10, 1971, the defendant
had an unpaid principal balance of $40,605.55. On February 19,
the plaintiff advanced additional funds to the defendant to pay
real estate taxes. When, on February 24, the defendant attempted to pay the balance outstanding on the principal as
computed two weeks earlier with a check bearing the notation
"mortgage principal balance in full," the plaintiff returned the
check. The defendant was informed that the Association refused to accept the check because the real estate tax advance
had been added to the outstanding mortgage principal, and for
this reason the amount of the check was insufficient to cover
the increased balance. Thereafter, the defendant paid to the
Association the amount advanced for taxes and again presented the check. The check was again refused.
The primary issue arising from these facts was whether the
plaintiff was prohibited by the terms of the mortgage note from
increasing its interest rate more than once. The court on appeal
was divided with regard to this issue, the disagreement centering on the validity of the plaintiff's argument that the language
of the mortgage clause was to be read together with section
215.21(3)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes.15 The majority agreed
with the Association and, pointing to the fact that the language
of the note and the statute was essentially similar, held: "It is
manifestly clear that by including the escalator clause in the
mortgage contract, the parties were doing so pursuant to the
statute. '"36 Furthermore, the majority concluded that by including the escalator clause, the parties desired the intendment of the statute to control the note. The note, then, was to
be given all of the properties of the statute as interpreted by
the court.
The court first determined that the statute was entitled to
a liberal construction. 7 It then found that the statute was am34. Id.
35. Wis. STAT. § 215.21 (3)(b) (1973) provides:
The mortgage or mortgage note may provide that the interest rate may be
increased after 3 years from the date hereof, by giving to the borrower at least 4
months' notice of such intention. The borrower may, after the receipt of such
notice, repay his loan within the time specified in such notice without payment
of any penalty.
36. 71 Wis. 2d at 178, 237 N.W.2d at 731.
37. In this respect, the court acknowledged that statutes in derogation of common
law rights to freedom of contract are generally strictly construed. 82 C.J.S. Statutes
942, § 393 (1953). However, the court distinguished from this broad class of legislation
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biguous,3 and so looked to its history, context, subject matter
and object intended to be remedied or accomplished in order
to ascertain the intent of the legislature. 9 Because the statute
did not prohibit a multiple utilization of an escalator clause
but merely provided the procedural mechanism by which it
could be used, the court reasoned that the statute was intended
to "cope with. . . changing economic conditions"4 to prevent
long-term notes from unprofitably constricting the availability
of investment funds. If intended to permit adjustment of the
mortgage note interest rate to current market conditions, more
than one use of the escalation provision was logically necessary:
If the clause were limited in use to a single occasion, the
association would necessarily be forced to make the single
increase as large as possible, since it could not foresee what
might happen in terms of economic conditions during the
intervening years between the increase and the end of the
mortgage term.4 '
Therefore, while the court deferred to the legislature to determine if the statute should restrict the amounts by which the
interest rates could be increased, it nevertheless concluded that
the statute did not limit the frequency of such escalations.
Consequently, the mortgage note itself permitted multiple in42
creases.
While the majority predicated its decision on the premise
that because the contract mimicked the language of the statute, the interpretation of the contract was subordinate to the
construction of the statute, the dissent rejected this premise
altogether. 43 Rather, it viewed the statute as merely a regulathose statutes which establish comprehensive regulatory systems, holding that the
latter are entitled to liberal construction. See Heiden v. City of Milwaukee, 226 Wis.
92, 100-01, 275 N.W. 922 (1937); Schumacker v. City of Milwaukee, 209 Wis. 43, 46,
243 N.W. 756 (1932); and SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON, § 61.03 at 51-52 (4th
ed. 1974).
38. Ambiguity is an essential requisite to statutory interpretation. Amidzich v.
Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 51, 170 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1969). A statute is
ambiguous when "it is capable of being understood by reasonably well informed persons in either of two or more senses." Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. D.N.R.,
63 Wis. 2d 175, 199, 216 N.W.2d 533, 535 (1974).
39. 71 Wis. 2d at 180, 237 N.W.2d at 732, citing Ortman v. Jensen & Johnson, Inc.,
66 Wis. 2d 508, 225 N.W.2d 635 (1975).
40. 71 Wis. 2d at 180, 237 N.W.2d at 732.
41. Id. at 181-82, 237 N.W.2d at 733.
42. Id. at 183, 237 N.W.2d at 734.
43. Chief Justice Wilkie and Justice Beilfuss joined in a dissent authored by Justice
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tory provision enabling the parties to a mortgage contract to
"provide that the interest rate may be increased."" According
to the dissent, the statute did not make interest rates in all
mortgage contracts subject to escalation, but merely permitted
the parties in their bargaining process to so provide.45 Therefore, as a provision of a contract included as a result of the
bargaining process of the parties, any questions relating to its
ambiquity and subsequent construction should be based on
established principles of contract law. If the provision is found
to be ambiguous, then it should be construed against its writer.
The effect of the court's decision in Wauwatosa Colony has
been modified by two subsequent events. First, the lack of
unanimity of the court has been ameliorated in part by the case
of Kaski v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,4 6 in
which the court again faced the question of the validity of a
mortgage interest rate escalation clause. This provision, however, was distinguished from that in Wauwatosa Colony by the
fact that its validity should not be governed by section
215.21(3)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes, but instead should be
controlled by corresponding federal legislation. Because the
trial court found the clause valid under the state statute, the
court reversed, giving the plaintiffs the option to request a new
trial to test the validity of the clause in light of the more appropriate legislation.
But in doing so, the court took the opportunity to state with
unanimity its view of section 215.21(3)(b): "Security Savings
& Loan Asso. . . . validated escalation clauses in respect to
Wisconsin savings and loan associations and held that even a
second escalation may be permitted under a properly drafted
agreement between the parties. ' ' 47 The precise significance of
this statement is difficult to assess. On the one hand, there
appears to be a shift in the opinion of the Wauwatosa Colony
majority from emphasizing the domination of the statute over
Heffernan. Justice Robert Hansen concurred in part, and dissented in part.
44. 71 Wis. 2d at 192, 237 N.W.2d at 738.
45. Throughout this dissent, emphasis was placed upon the duty of the parties to
bargain for such a provision, and the duty of the scrivener of the contract to unambiguously provide its terms. Moreover, the justices joining in this dissent apparently took
notice of a practice not uncommon in such financing situations: omitting an interest
escalation clause in turn for a higher initial interest rate. Id. at 192, 237 N.W.2d at
738.
46. 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240 N.W.2d 367 (1976).
47. Id. at 134, 240 N.W.2d at 369-70.
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the contract to emphasizing the requirement of a properly
drafted agreement. On the other hand, the Wauwatosa Colony
dissenting justices seem to now be subscribing to an interpretation of the statute permitting multiple increases.
Second, new legislation repealing section 215.21(3)(b), and
creating a new section 138.05311 has modified the Wauwatosa
48. 1975 Wis. Laws, ch. 387, § 1, creating section 138.053 of the statutes to read:
138.053 Regulation of interest adjustment provisions
(1) Required contract provisions. No contract between a borrower and a
lender secured by a first lien real estate mortgage on, or an equivalent security
interest in, an owner-occupied residential property containing not more than 4
dwelling units may authorize the lender to increase the borrower's contractual
rate of interest unless the contract provides that:
(a) No increase may occur until 3 years after the date of the contract;
(b) No increase may occur unless the borrower is given at least 4 months'

written notice of the lender's intent to increase the rate of interest, during which
notice period the borrower may repay his or her obligation without penalty;
(c) The amount of the initial interest rate increase may not exceed $1 per
$100 for one year computed upon the declining principal balance;
(d) The amount of any subsequent interest rate increase may not exceed
$1 per $200 for one year computed upon the declining principal balance;
(e) The interest rate may not be increased more than one time in any 12month period; and
(f) The loan may be prepaid without penalty at any time at which the
interest rate in effect exceeds the originally stated interest rate by more than
$2 per $100 for one year computed upon the declining principal balance.
(2) Disclosures required. No lender may make a loan secured by a first
lien real estate mortgage on, or an equivalent security interest in, an owneroccupied residential property containing not more than 4 dwelling units providing for prospective changes in the rate of interest unless it has clearly and
conspicuously disclosed to the borrower in writing:
(a) That the interest rate is prospectively subject to change;
(b) That notice of any interest adjustment must be given 4 months prior
to any increase; and
(c) Any prepayment rights of the borrower upon receiving notice of such
change.
(3) Notice of interest adjustment. Notices provided under sub. (2) shall
be mailed to the borrower at his or her last-known post-office address and shall
clearly and concisely disclose:
(a) The effective date of the interest rate increase;
(b) The increased interest rate and the extent to which the increased rate
will exceed the interest rate in effect immediately before the increase;
(c) The amount of the borrower's contractual monthly principal and interest payment before and after the effective date of the increase;
(d) Any right of the borrower to voluntarily increase his or her contractual
principal and interest payment;
(e) Whether as a result of the increase a lump sum payment may be necessary at the end of the loan term;
(f) Whether an additional number of monthly payments may be required;
and
(g) The borrower's right to prepay within 4 months without a charge.
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Colony decision with regard to those situations arising after
June 12, 1976. The new statute includes a number of provisions
which were contained in the former. It prohibits mortgage interest rate escalation within three years of the contract's execution, requires four month's written notice to be given the
debtor, and allows the debtor to satisfy the obligation within
this time without penalty.
The new statute, however, departs from the former in a
number of important ways, and clarifies the questions left unanswered by these cases. First, it provides that the amount of
the initial increase may not exceed one percent per year computed on the declining principal balance. Moreover, the new
legislation provides that no subsequent rate increase may exceed one half of one percent computed on the declining principal balance and that subsequent increases shall not be more
frequent than once every twelve months. The debtor is thereby
initially assured that no increase will occur during the first
three years of the indebtedness and that thereafter the rate will
only increase by one percent the first year, and one half percent
each following year.
Second, the new legislation further protects the debtor by
permitting prepayment of the indebtedness without penalty
whenever the interest rate exceeds the original by two percent.
Thus, if a lender increases the interest rate of the mortgage by
these statutory maximums, any additional increase will permit
the debtor to repay the loan without penalty five years after the
contract's inception.
Third, and perhaps most important with respect to the
Wauwatosa Colony decision, the new statute requires full disclosure by the lender, informing the borrower of the fact that
the rate may be increased, the notice to which is is entitled,
and his right to prepayment without penalty. Perhaps through
this disclosure, questions as to whether the parties intended the
provision to be a part of the mortgage contract may be avoided.
Even though the statute makes great strides in clarifying
the conditions under which a mortgage escalator clause may be
utilized, its applicability is nevertheless limited. It is first lim(4) Applicability. (a) This section does not apply to variable rate contracts, nor to loans or forbearances to corporations.
(b) This section applies only to transactions initially entered into on or
after the effective date of this act (1975).
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ited to interest escalation clauses. It is limited, also, to transactions initially entered into on or after the effective date of the
act, June 12, 1976. Most significantly, it is limited to first lien
real estate mortgages on or security interests in owner-occupied
residential property comprising not more than four dwelling
units. Finally, the statute is inapplicable to loans or forbearances made to corporations.
Because of these limitations, the validity of certain escalation provisions may still be in question. For example, because
the new statute is inapplicable to loans made to corporations,
the defendant in Wauwatosa Colony would not have been able
to rely on the new legislation. But because the Act repealed
section 215.21(3)(b), on which the escalation provision in
Wauwatosa Colony was obviously based, some question still
exists as to whether any mortgage rate escalation clause, except
one which meets the requisites of the new statute, may be
utilized at all. Therefore, much remains to be clarified in this
area of the law.
C. Changed-ConditionsClauses
In Metropolitan Sewerage Commission v. R. W. Construction,4" the court held that a contractor was entitled to an
equitable adjustment of the contract price under a changedconditions clause when actual conditions encountered materially differed from those indicated in the project specifications
and drawings. This provision was contained in a contract for
the construction of a subterranean sewerage system executed
by the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of Milwaukee and
R. W. Construction, the contractor, and provided that in the
event that a latent condition was encountered which materially
differed from those indicated in the specifications and drawings, the time allowed for completion and the cost of the project
could be adjusted. 0
The contract itself was a composite of various specifications, drawings and agreements. Before contract bids were
sought, the Commission had sixteen boring tests performed
along the route of the project. From these test results, or logs,
a consulting firm prepared contract drawings to indicate the
area's subterranean composition, particularily the presence or
49. 72 Wis. 2d 365, 241 N.W.2d 371 (1976).
50. Id. at 368-69, 241 N.W.2d at 374-75.
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absence of artesian water. 51 Bidding instructions given to the
prospective bidders indicated that the actual test logs would be
available for inspection, but the contract specifications, also a
part of the bidding documents, included an assurance that the
result and locations of the borings were shown in the drawings.52 Finally, the contract itself contained provisions for equitable adjustment of the terms of the contract in the event that
the actual conditions encountered materially deviated
from
3
those indicated in the drawings and specifications.1
Almost immediately after the contractor began work in
August 1969, artesian water was discovered. Normal measures
to control the problem failed, and upon the suggestion of a
consultant to the contractor, the route of the project was modified under the changed-conditions clause. However, further
progress resulted in further artesian water discoveries, requiring additional measures to be taken. Finally, in February 1971,
all work halted when carbon dioxide gas, generated in part by
measures used to control the flooding, escaped the tunnel and
permeated the surrounding residential neighborhood. The local
health commissioner ordered both the Commission and the
contractor to abate the hazard, resulting in a complete halt to
the work. When the contractor again attempted to invoke the
changed-conditions provision, the Commission refused and
notified the contractor that unless work was resumed within
ten days, the contract would be terminated. The contractor
refused to recommence work without relief, and the contract
was terminated by the Commission. The Commission then
brought this action to recover damages, and was awarded judgment.
In the opinion of the court, one issue was controlling on
appeal: "Did [the contractor] encounter an artesian water
condition which materially differed from the conditions shown
in the drawings and indicated in the specifications, so that it
was entitled to receive an equitable adjustment in the contract
price? ' ' s4 In formulating this issue, the court catagorized
51. Id. at 366-67, 241 N.W.2d at 374. The importance of the presence of artesian
water, as distinguished from static water, is the difficulty it presents in subterranean
excavaction efforts. Artesian water is under pressure, and requires complicated and
time-consuming measures to control. Static water, however, is not under pressure and
is more easily removed or drawn down.
52. Id. at 376, 241 N.W.2d at 378.
53. Id. at 368, 241 N.W.2d at 374-75.
54. Id. at 371, 241 N.W.2d at 376.
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changed-conditions clauses into two groups. The first group
consists of clauses which attempt to resolve conflicts where the
conditions encountered materially differ from the conditions
indicated. The second group includes clauses which cover situations where unknown conditions of an unusual nature were
encountered. Finding the changed-conditions clause in the instant contract to be of the first type, the court relied upon
federal case law to state: "[T]he applicability of the modern
changed-conditions clause depends only upon a comparison of
the actually encountered conditions with the indicated conditions, and not upon the fulfillment of equitable or common-law
prerequisites to relief."55 Therefore, the court reasoned, the
question of what conditions were shown in the drawings or
indicated in the specifications, and the question of whether the
conditions actually encountered materially differed from those
indicated, were both questions of law and subject to its independent review. A third question, directed to the determination of what conditions were actually encountered, was denominated a question of fact.
However, only the question going to the conditions represented in the contract was discussed. 6 To determine what has
been represented in a construction contract of this nature, the
court enunciated the rule that although the representations
made need not be explicit or specific, the information they
contain must positively indicate the existence of conditions
other than those actually encountered. 57 Presumably, then, if
the specifications give only a neutral indication of the existence
of water, the representation will be adequate to indicate the
existence of either artesian or static water.5 8 When, however,
the existence of static water is affirmatively indicated in the
specifications, the contract will not be construed as indicating
the existence of artesian water. The court determined that the
55. Id. at 372-73, 241 N.W.2d at 377.
56. The trial court's determination that artesian water was actually encountered
was not disturbed by the court. Moreover, the trial court's legal conclusion that artesian water materially differed from static water was likewise accepted. Id. at 373-74,
241 N.W.2d at 377.
57. Id. at 374-75, 241 N.W.2d at 377-78.
58. This example is drawn from the case of Flippin Materials Co. v. United States,
312 F.2d 408 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cited by the R. W. Constructioncourt, wherein the contractor was not entitled to assume pockets of soil indicated as being present in a limestone
layer were composed of sand and not clay.
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specifications in this contract clearly and positively indicated
static water:
It is undisputed that the contract drawings of the borings do
not state that water rose in the boring after it was encountered in drilling, which is the acceptable method of noting
artesian water. The drawings state only that the water level
is at a certain depth. This is an affirmative indication of
static water, not artesian water.59
Although the contract was comprised of numerous documents, the court held that the contractor was entitled to rely
upon information obtained by boring tests as it was represented in the contract drawings. Sixteen boring tests were conducted, but only one of the written logs prepared from the data
obtained from these tests indicated the existence of artesian
rather than ground Water. The contract drawings prepared to
reflect the locations and results of the tests did not, however,
reveal this condition. The court, then, concluded that the contractor had a right to rely on the representation made in the
drawings, and was not obligated to search through the written
logs to find the single artesian water notation." While a contractor is held to the standard of what a reasonable contractor-relying on his past experience, the customs and insights
shared generally by contractors in the area, and the information conveyed by the contract-would have anticipated under
similar conditions,6 ' the court nevertheless concluded that
these factors did not impeach the reasonableness of the contractor's reliance on the contract drawings. 2
Further, the court held that the Commission is deemed to
have warranted the adequacy of its plans and specifications as3
indications of the complexity and nature of the undertaking.
The result, then, seems to be that when inconsistencies appear
on the face of the various components of a construction con59. 72 Wis. 2d at 375, 241 N.W.2d at 378 (footnote omitted).

60. In this respect, the court pointed to a provision in the contract specifications
which provided:
The Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee has made
test borings along the route of that portion of the sewer in this contract. The
logs and locations of these borings are shown on the drawings . . ..
The court concluded that this was a specific and express indication that the contract
drawings accurately represented the boring test results. Id. at 376, 371 N.W.2d at 378.
61. Id. at 377-78, 371 N.W.2d at 379.
62. Id. at 378-79, 371 N.W.2d at 379-80.
63. Id. at 379, 371 N.W.2d at 380.
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tract of this nature, the contractor is entitled to rely on the one
portion which synopsizes the vast information found in the
entirety. This is true, apparently, even though the contractor
knows of the existence of documents containing further data
and is requested to consult them. 4
Finally, the court held that this contractor's deficiencies
with regard to pre-bid planning and post-award performance
had no bearing on the contractor's right to an equitable adjustment under the changed-conditions provision. 5 Rather, these
were factors to be considered in determining the amount of
adjustment to which the contractor was entitled after it had
initially been determined that an adjustment was warranted.
If the contractor had increased costs due to his inefficiency in
planning and performance, he must absorb them. Therefore,
the amount of equitable adjustment to which a contractor is
entitled is "the difference between what it reasonably cost to
do the work under the actually encountered conditions and
what it would have cost if the materially different conditions
had not been encountered." 66 The contractor's right to an equitable adjustment is not jeopardized by his inefficiencies, but
the amount of his recovery is.
This decision is important insofar as it attempts to summarize the duties and obligations of the parties to a government
project contract. The necessity of consistency between the various components of such a contract is made clear by the fact
that the court has allowed the contractor to rely upon one of
those components. Contract indications which affirmatively
represent only one of two possible, though similar, conditions
will be the controlling factor in determining the materiality of
differences actually encountered. Finally, the inadequacies of
the contractor's planning and performance will at most lessen
the amount of his equitable adjustment. This last conclusion,
however, is a difficult one to reach. While the contractor is held
to the standard of what a reasonable contractor, with similar
experience and information, would expect in determining the
reasonableness of his interpretation of and reliance on the contract specifications, and therefore his right to an equitable ad64. Id. at 376-78, 371 N.W.2d at 378-79.
65. Id. at 383, 371 N.W.2d at 381-82.
66. Id. at 384, 371 N.W.2d at 382.
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justment," the adequacy of his preparation and performance
merely reduces the amount of the adjustment. The court
should make a clearer distinction between these tests, for the
same instances of action or nonaction, reasonableness or unreasonableness, might apply to either test.
D. Covenants Not to Compete
In Behnke v. Hertz Corp.,6" the court held that the restrictions imposed by a covenant not to compete must be reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer to be valid and
enforceable. The protection afforded the employer was limited
by the court to the unique characteristics of the employment,
the trade secrets and customer lists of the employer, and the
geographical scope of its business.
The convenant not to compete under consideration in this
case was contained in a contract between National Car Rental
System and one of its employees who processed lease agreements with its customers.69 The employee did not utilize any
customer lists nor did she know any of National's trade secrets.
The employee was assigned to National's Milwaukee airport
counter, its only place of business in the area. After approximately six months, the employee terminated her employment
with National and took a similar position with the Hertz
Corporation. She was assigned to the latter's railroad depot
location.
The plaintiff, who owned the National franchise, brought
suit against Hertz for inducing the employee's breach of the
covenant. The trial court found for the plaintiff and awarded
both compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the covenant invalid as a matter
of law, and remanded the case for dismissal. 0
In Wisconsin, covenants not to compete are controlled by
section 103.465 of the Wisconsin Statutes, requiring that such
covenants be reasonable in their scope and reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the employer.7 1 Because such
67. Id. at 377-78, 371 N.W.2d at 379. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
68. 70 Wis. 2d 818, 235 N.W.2d 690 (1975).
69. The covenant signed by the employee stated: "I agree not to work for any car
rental competitor in the City of Milwaukee for one year if and when this present job is
terminated." Id. at 820, 235 N.W.2d at 692.
70. Id. at 819-20, 235 N.W.2d at 691-92.
71. Wis. STAT. § 103.465 (1973) provides:
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covenants are generally looked upon with disfavor,7 2 the court
gave two factors to be considered in evaluating a covenant's
reasonableness: (a) whether enforcement of its terms would be
necessary to prevent the use of the employer's trade secrets or
customer lists, and (b) whether the services of the employee
are unique.13 If neither condition exists, the fact that the employee will exercise, in the absence of enforcement, skills and
knowledge acquired during his employment is not sufficient to
allow the covenant's enforcement.74 The court found that the
services of this particular employee were not unique, and that
she had no knowledge of trade secrets or lists.
The court further indicated that even if the covenant were
enforceable because of the nature of the employment, it was
nevertheless unenforceable because of geographical limitations. Covenants not to compete are limited geographically by
the territorial extent of the employer's business, and this geographical scope may not be broadened contractually.75 Here,
because the actual business of the employer was limited to the
Milwaukee airport, the covenant, in spite of its attempt to
encompass all of the greater Milwaukee area, would have been
enforceable only within the airport area.76

A.

Ill. DEFENSES
Defenses to Claims of Materials Suppliers

In Schneider Fuel & Supply Co. v. West Allis State Bank,77
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his employer or principal during the term of the employment or agency, or thereafter,
within a specified territory and during a specified time is lawful and enforceable
only if the restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of
the employer or principal. Any such restrictive covenant imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as to so much of the covenant or performance as would be a reasonable restraint.
72. 70 Wis. 2d at 821, 235 N.W.2d at 692. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 513 (1973).
73. Id. at 822, 235 N.W.2d at 693. The court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, § 516(f), Comment h at 996 (1973), which states:
A promise of a former employee will not ordinarily be enforced so as to preclude
him from exercising skill and knowledge acquired in his employer's business,
even if the competition is injurious to the latter, except so far as to prevent the
use of trade secrets or lists of customers, or unless the services of the employee
are of a unique character.
74. Id. at 822-23, 235 N.W.2d at 693.
75. Wisconsin Ice & Coal Co. v. Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819 (1933).
76. 70 Wis. 2d at 823, 235 N.W.2d at 694.
77. 70 Wis. 2d 1041, 236 N.W.2d 266 (1975).
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the court expanded the scope of section 289.16 of the Wisconsin
Statutes to hold that funds received by a bank from a contractor engaged in public improvement contracts are held in trust
by the bank and subject to the claims of the contractor's suppliers.
This case arose out of business arrangements between the
contractor and the plaintiff-supplier and financing arrangements between the contractor and the bank. The plaintiff supplied the contractor with various materials under an open
credit arrangement. Money received from the contractor was
applied to the oldest of its accounts. On September 16, 1976,
the contractor owed the plaintiff $318,912 for materials supplied before the contractor entered into a contract with a municipal corporation for the purpose of building sewers. All materials supplied to the contractor for use in the municipal project were supplied after September 6. After this date, the contractor paid a total of $250,000 to the plaintiff. Because these
payments were credited to the earlier accounts, none of the
materials supplied for the municipal project were paid, leaving
at the time the contractor ceased doing business an outstanding balance of $397,366.18.
Under the arrangement between the contractor and the
bank, the contractor submitted an assignment form and an
invoice addressed to its customer in exchange for a loan of
seventy percent of the invoice amount. The assignment of the
account was taken by the bank as collateral. The total outstanding debt, however, was limited to $75,000. When the contractor was paid by its customer, it deposited the funds in its
personal account with the bank, from which it would draw a
check payable to the bank.
The supplier brought this action against the bank for the
value of the materials supplied to the contractor for the municipal project, contending that funds received by the contractor
were held in trust by the bank for the satisfaction of its claim.
Judgment was awarded to the plaintiff and the bank appealed,
raising five issues.
The first issue raised by the bank was whether the supplier
was a claimant under section 289.16 of the Wisconsin Statutes. 5 The bank contended that the supplier was not a claim78. Wis. STAT. § 289.16 (1973) provides:
Theft by contractors. All moneys, bonds or warrants paid or to become due,
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ant under the statute because it did not make immediate demands for payment of each individual supply contract with the
contractor, and because its open account arrangement with the
contractor negated any knowledge on the part of the bank and
the contractor that the supplier was demanding payment from
the contract proceeds. Further, the defendant argued that the
trust imposed by section 289.16 was not created until a claim
was made by a materials supplier.
The court summarily rejected these arguments on two
grounds. First, the court cited Weather-Tite Co. v. Leppe 9 for
the rule that the statute makes no material distinction between
a claimamt and a creditor. While the bank inferred from the
term "claimant" some affirmative action on the part of a creditor to collect an account, the court concluded that such efforts
were unnecessary to invoke the statute and required only that
the creditor have supplied "materials used for such
improvements.

80

Second, the court rejected the arguments

81
because they were raised for the first time on appeal.
The second issue raised by the bank was whether it could
be considered to be a trustee of the funds for the purposes of
section 289.16. The bank contended that the constructive trust
imposed on the funds by the statute existed "only when and
while they are in the hands of the contractor ' 82 and not upon a
portion of those funds paid by the contractor to the bank. The
bank further contended that its duty as a depository bank of
trust funds was governed by section 112.01(10) .8 This section
to any prime contractor or subcontractor for public improvements are a trust

fund in his hands: and the use of the moneys by him for any purpose other than
the payment of claims on such public improvement, before the claims have been
satisfied, constitutes theft and is punishable under s. 943.20. Until all claims
are paid in full, have matured by notice and filing or have expired, such money,
bonds and warrants shall not be subject to garnishment, execution, levy or
attachment.
79. 25 Wis. 2d 70, 130 N.W.2d 198 (1964) (construing Wis. STAT. § 289.02(4) (1963)
which imposed a constructive trust upon proceeds paid to a contractor for work done
on private improvements.)
80. 70 Wis. 2d at 1047, 236 N.W.2d at 269.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1048, 236 N.W.2d at 269.
83. Wis. STAT. § 112.01(10) (1973) provides:
DEPOSIT IN FIDUCIARY'S PERSONAL ACCOUNT. If a fiduciary makes a deposit in a
bank to his personal credit of checks drawn by him upon an account in his own
name as fiduciary, or of checks payable to him as fiduciary, or of checks drawn
by him upon an account in the name of his principal if he is empowered to draw
checks thereon, or of checks payable to his principal and indorsed by him, if he
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requires actual knowledge of a breach of trust by a fiduciary in
making withdrawals from such funds to impose liability on a
depository bank.
The bank, however, was not merely the depository bank of
the funds but also the payee of the funds withdrawn, and the
court relied upon this in refusing to limit the bank's responsibility to that declared in section 112.01(10) and in distinguishing the cases proffered by the bank which required actual
knowledge. 4 While citing section 112.01(8)1 for the proposition
that when a payee, rather than a drawee, bank is involved,
additional responsibilities are imposed with regard to the use
of trust funds, the court relied primarily upon the Commissioner's Notes to the Uniform Fiduciaries Act: "[W]here the
fiduciary makes a deposit in his personal account and subsequently pays a personal debt to the bank by a check on that
account, the bank must ascertain what is done with the funds
withdrawn."8' 6 The court reasoned that because the bank knew
the origin of the funds received by the contractor, because it
was a payee as well as drawee of the funds transferred, and
because of the responsibilities deriving from the trust imposed
by section 289.16, the bank was a trustee of those funds received from the contractor for the purposes of the statute.
This, perhaps, is the most significant, although confusing,
aspect of the decision. However, the legislature has since nullified its consequences for those situations arising on or after
June 11, 1976, by amending both sections 112.01(10)7 and
is empowered to indorse such checks, or if he otherwise makes a deposit of funds
held by him as fiduciary, the bank receiving such deposit is not bound to inquire
whether the fiduciary is committing thereby a breach of his obligation as fiduciary; and the bank is authorized to pay the amount of the deposit or any part
thereof upon the personal check of the fiduciary without being liable to the
principal, unless the bank receives the deposit or pays the check with actual
knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in making such deposit or in drawing such check, or with knowledge of
such facts that its action in receiving the deposit or paying the check amounts
to bad faith.
84. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. v. American State Bank, 244 Wis. 203, 12
N.W.2d 133 (1943); Murphy v. National Paving Co., 229 Wis. 100, 281 N.W. 705 (1938).
85. Wis. STAT. § 112.01(8) (1973).
86. 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT., Uniform FiduciariesAct § 9, Commissioner's Notes
at 414-15 (West 1970).
87. 1975 Wis. Laws, ch. 409, § 1, amending Wis. STAT. § 112.01(10) (1976) to read:
Deposit in fiduciary's personal account. If a fiduciary makes a deposit in
a bank to . . . the fiduciary's personal credit of checks drawn by . . . the

fiduciary upon an account in his or her own name as fiduciary, or of checks

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:379

289.16.88 The new legislation effectively reverses the court's
decision by imposing a trust on funds received by a contractor
for public improvements only so long as they are held by the
contractor. Checks drawn on the contractor's personal account
made payable to a drawee bank for the satisfaction of a personal obligation will no longer impose liability on that bank in
the absence of knowledge of a breach of trust or bad faith. In
such a case the civil cause of action is limited to an action
against the contractor.89
The bank also raised a third issue of whether it was a holder
in due course of the check received from the contractor. As a
holder in due course, the bank hoped to claim the defenses
afforded by section 403.305 of the Wisconsin Statutes. However, the court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, it
interpreted section 403.302 as requiring the claimant to the
status of holder in due course to have actual possession of the
payable to . . . the fiduciary as fiduciary, or of checks drawn by . . . the
fiduciary upon an account in the name of his or her principal if. . . the fiduciary
is empowered to draw checks thereon, or of checks payable to his or her principal
and indorsed by. . . the fiduciary, if. . . the fiduciary is empowered to indorse
such checks, or if. . . the fiduciary otherwise makes a deposit of funds held by
: . . the fiduciary as fiduciary, the bank receiving such deposit is not bound to
inquire whether the fiduciary is committing thereby a breach of his or her
obligation as fiduciary. . . . The bank is authorized to pay the amount of the
deposit or any part thereof upon the personal check of the fiduciary, including
checks payable to the bank, without being liable to the principal, unless the
bank receives the deposit or pays the check with actual knowledge that the
fiduciary is committing a breach of his or her obligation as fiduciary in making
such deposit or in drawing such check, or with knowledge of such facts that its
action in receiving the deposit or paying the check amounts to bad faith, and
the bank paying the check is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is
committing thereby a breach of his or her obligationas fiduciary.
88. 1975 Wis. Laws, ch. 409, § 3, amending Wis. STAT. § 289.16 (1973) to read:
All moneys, bonds or warrants paid or to become due, to any prime contractor or subcontractor for public improvements are a trust fund only in . . . the
hands. . . of the prime contractoror subcontractorand shall not be a trust fund
in the hands of any other person. The use of the moneys by . . . the prime
contractoror subcontractorfor any purpose other than the payment of claims
on such public improvement, before the claims have been satisfied, constitutes
theft by the prime contractororsubcontractorand is punishable under s. 943.20.
This section shall not create a civil cause of action against any person other than
the prime contractoror subcontractorto whom such moneys arepaid or become
due. Until all claims are paid in full, have matured by notice and filing or have
expired, such money, bonds and warrants shall not be subject to garnishment,
execution, levy or attachment.
89. 1975 Wis. Laws, ch. 409, §§ 1, 3.
90. Wis. STAT. § 403.302 (1973).
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instrument.9 1 The court found no evidence that the bank had
possession of the check:
We deal here with checks paid from [the contractor's] account and canceled or stamped "Paid" by the bank. There
is nothing in this record to negative the usual banking practice of returning canceled checks to the person on whose account they were drawn. No attempt was made at the trial
court to suggest or establish that the defendant bank was "in
possession" of such canceled checks.2
Because the bank failed to prove possession, the court found
that it was not entitled to the status of holder in due course.
The court also rejected the argument because the bank was
chargeable with knowledge that the funds in its possession were
subject to a statutory trust and therefore took the funds with
notice of a claim to them on the part of another person. 3
Finally, the court summarily rejected the bank's contention
that it was entitled to the defenses of laches and equitable
estoppel. The court held that the bank had not been prejudiced
by the supplier's failure to promptly make its claim against the
bank, and that there was no duty on the part of the plaintiff
to inform the bank of defaults in payment by the contractor. 4
B. Accord and Satisfaction
In Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v.
Thoreson Food Products,95 the court determined that the Interstate Commerce Act precluded the use of accord and satisfaction as a defense to a suit brought by an interstate carrier for
shipping charges.
The plaintiff, a foreign railroad corporation subject to the
Interstate Commerce Act, made two shipments of canned
goods to the defendant. The transportation costs of the first
shipment were prepaid by the defendant, but when it was discovered that some of the goods had been spoiled in transit, the
defendant initially refused to accept them. The defendant then
agreed to salvage as much of the goods as possible following
91. The term "holder" is defined as a person who is "in possession of a document
of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him
or to his order or to bearer or in blank." wis. STAT. § 401.201(20) (1973).
92. 70 Wis. 2d at 1051-52, 236 N.W.2d at 271.
93. Wis. STAT. § 403.302(1)(c) (1973).
94. 70 Wis. 2d at 1053-55, 236 N.W.2d at 272-73.
95. 71 Wis. 2d 143, 238 N.W.2d 69 (1976).
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discussions with the plaintiff's claims representative. When the
defendant later submitted its claim for the lost goods to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff denied it.
Meanwhile, the plaintiff transported the second load of
goods to the defendant. The charges for this shipment were not
prepaid, and amounted to $1758.96. The defendant's informal
complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commission for the
losses to the first shipment was denied,96 and consequently the
defendant sent payment in the amount of $167.33 to the plaintiff. This check was accompanied by a letter which stated that
its amount represented the difference between the freight
charges for the second shipment and the damages claimed for
the losses to the first shipment. 7 The plaintiff cashed the
check.
The trial court, on motions for summary judgment, held
that the defendant had a complete defense to the plaintiff's
claim for the freight charges on the second shipment. The
supreme court disagreed, concluding that while all of the elements of accord and satisfaction may have been present,98 the
applicability of the Act required the defense to be pleaded as
a counterclaim and proved as such.9 The purpose of the Act,
the court stated, was to avoid preferential treatment of some
shippers to others.' 0 Therefore only judicially supervised setoffs would be permissible under the Act; privately arranged
settlements and the assertion of accord and satisfaction would
not.10'
The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the
plaintiff was estopped from asserting the Act's two years and
96. Id. at 145-46, 238 N.W.2d at 71. The Commission denied the claim on the
grounds that it lacked jurisdiction, and advised the defendant to furnish additional
evidence to the plaintiff or to bring a court action.
97. Id. at 146, 238 N.W.2d at 71. The check itself bore the notation, "[i]n settlement of the above account."
98. Of the elements to the defense of accord and satisfaction, the court stated:
As a generalization, it is the law of this state that when a party accepts,
without objection, a check which he knows to be offered in full settlement of a
disputed account, he is estopped from claiming in the future that the account
has not been settled. The acceptance of the check constitutes a good accord and
satisfaction.
Id. at 146, 238 N.W.2d at 71.
99. Id. at 149-50, 238 N.W.2d at 73.
100. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1970).
101. 71 Wis. 2d at 148-49, 238 N.W.2d at 72.
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one day statute of limitations against its damage claim. ' "' The
court reasoned that even though certain representations had
been made by the plaintiff's claims representative, the defendant's reliance on those representations was not reasonable in
view of the Commission's previous rejection of its claim.
C. Defenses of Surety Bondsmen
In Riley Construction Co. v. Schillmoeller & Krofl Co.,'
the court held that in an action against a surety, the terms of
the principal contract and of the bond are to be read together,
and that any contract defense available to the principal is also
available to the bondsman.
Three subcontractors entered into similar contracts with a
general contractor for the construction of condominium apartments. Each contract called for a monthly payment to the
subcontractors of a proportion of the value of the work accomplished the previous month, with a final payment at the completion of the work. In addition, the contracts provided that
these payments were to be made after the equivalent payment
had been received from the owner by the contractor.' 4
The contractor obtained a payment bond from the defendant surety. While the bond assured the payments due the
subcontractors in terms similar to those of the subcontracts, it
failed to include the proviso of withholding payment until
money had been received from the owner.' 5
The subcontractors completed their work satisfactorily, but
the owner failed to make final payment to the general contractor. The general contractor, therefore, made no final payments
to the subcontractors. The subcontractors brought separate
actions against the general contractor and the surety, the actions were consolidated for trial, and judgment was granted to
the plaintiffs.
The surety contended at trial and on appeal that it was not
liable to the subcontractors on the bond because the general
contractor was not liable to them on the contract. But the trial
court refused to look beyond the terms of the bond and denied
the surety the right to assert the contract defense. The supreme
court reversed for two reasons.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970).
70 Wis. 2d 900, 236 N.W.2d 195 (1975).
Id. at 902-03, 236 N.W.2d at 196.
Id. at 903, 236 N.W.2d at 197.
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First, looking to the law of suretyship in other jurisdictions,
the court held that not only is the surety's liability to the claimant measured by the liability of the principal, but also that the
surety may normally set up any defense to the claim available
to the principal.'"' Moreover, the bond and the contract it assures must be read together to determine liability. 017
Second, the court found error in the construction given the
language of the bond itself. The trial court had interpreted the
terms of payment stated in the bond as automatically resulting
in the surety's liability for full payment. The supreme court,
however, held that the bond merely conferred upon the subcontractors the right to bring an action against the general contractor, the surety, or both.'"8 Once an action was brought, the
subcontractors were required to prove their case. The trial
court should have thereupon construe the terms of both the
contracts and the bonds. Only after the contractor was found
to have breached the contract would the surety be liable.0 "
D.

Unjust Enrichment

In Seegers v. Sprauge,1" the court held that an action
brought by a subcontractor to recover the value of materials
and services rendered to a landowner in constructing certain
improvements, though denominated an action in quantum
meruit, nevertheless required a showing that the landowner
had been enriched under circumstances which were unjust.
The defendant owned two lots upon which he was building
houses. He arranged with a contractor for the installation of
plumbing and septic systems. The contractor in turn requested
the plaintiffs to install the septic systems. Before the work
began, the plaintiff inspected the sites, met the defendant, and
informed him that larger systems than those planned would be
necessary and that the plaintiff would be installing them. The
defendant agreed to the larger systems, and also requested that
the plaintiff remove any excess earth to a particular area.
When the work was completed, the plaintiffs sent their bills
106. Id. at 905, 236 N.W.2d at 198.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 906, 236 N.W.2d at 198.
109. Id., 236 N.W.2d at 198-99. Because the trial court had not considered the
effect of the contract language upSon the right of the subcontractors to payment, the
court ruled that summary judgment was inappropriate.
110. 70 Wis. 2d 997, 236 N.W.2d 227 (1975).
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to the contractor who was to present them to the owner for
payment. When the plaintiffs did not receive payment, they
encumbered the properties. The contractor, meanwhile, absconded. The plaintiffs, therefore, brought this action against
the landowner after their efforts to enforce their mechanic's
lien failed."'
The plaintiffs, denominating their action as one in
quantum meruit, prevailed at trial on the basis that services
were performed at the instance of the defendant with the expectation of reasonable compensation."2 The trial court, however, did not address the question of whether the defendant was
unjustly enriched in retaining the benefit of those services. The
supreme court concluded that the principle of unjust enrichment is a common theme to all quasi-contract actions, imposing similar elements:
(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff,
(2) appreciation by the defendant of the fact of such benefit,
and (3) acceptance and retention by the defendant of the
benefit, under circumstances such that it would be inequitable to retain the benefit without payment of the value
thereof."'
Therefore, the person conferring the benefit on the other may
not avoid the requirement of showing that the recipient was
unjustly enriched by denominating his action as quantum meruit. The testimony of the defendant that payment for the services rendered by the plaintiffs was made to the contractor was
consequently relevant to this issue.
Finally, the court held that the contacts between the parties
were insufficient to negate the plaintiffs' status as subcontractors and to permit the finding of an implied agreement. The
plaintiffs, as subcontractors, were requested to perform the primary service of installing the systems by the contractor, and
not at the special instance of the landowner."' Recovery under
quantum meruit, unlike unjust enrichment, would require
facts sufficient to support a finding that the services were performed upon the request of the landowner.
111. Id. at 998-1000, 236 N.W.2d at 228.
112. Id. at 1002, 236 N.W.2d at 229. See also Estate of Voss, 20 Wis. 2d 238, 241,
121 N.W.2d 744 (1963).
113. Id. at 1003-04, 236 N.W.2d at 230.
114. Id., 236 N.W.2d at 231.
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WARRANTIES

Finally, in Mulvaney v. Tri State Truck & Auto Body,
Inc.," 5 the court held that the transfer of a certificate of title
to a vehicle carried with it a warranty of title which could not
be modified or excluded by agreement.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages sustained as a result of the defendant's breach of warranty of title
to an automobile sold to the plaintiff by the defendant when it
was discovered that the vehicle had been stolen. The defendant
testified that he had obtained the vehicle through a newspaper
advertisement from an out-of-state source. The defendant
claimed to have informed the plaintiff of this, and of the fact
that the odometer reading consequently could not be verified.
The plaintiff had the title checked by the bank supplying the
purchase money and was assured by it that the title was valid
and unencumbered. Finally, the defendant tendered to the
plaintiff a certificate of title bearing the warning, "This Vehicle
May Be Subject To An Undisclosed Security Interest," and
warned the plaintiff that no warranty of title could be made."'
The court concluded that no such modification or exclusion
of warranty would be valid. Section 342.15(1) of the Wisconsin
Statutes ' 7 requires the seller of an automobile to warrant its
title, and the certificate of title in this case bore the language,
"For value received I (We) hereby sell, transfer and assign the
vehicle and warrant title to said vehicle described on this certificate."" 8 The statute, the court reasoned, was intended to
further the public policy of protecting purchasers of goods so
easily the subject of fraudulent sales."' The requirement that
the warranty follow the transfer of a vehicle's certificate of title
was not negated by the warning that the vehicle might be sub2
ject to an undisclosed security interest. 1
115. 70 Wis. 2d 760, 235 N.W.2d 460 (1975).
116. Id. at 761-63, 235 N.W.2d at 462.
117. Wis. STAT. § 345.15(1) (1973) provides:
If an owner transfers his interest in a vehicle, other than by the creation of a
security interest, he shall at the time of the delivery of the vehicle, execute an
assignment and warranty to title to the transferee in the space provided therefore on the certificate. ...
118. 70 Wis. 2d at 763, 235 N.W.2d at 463.
119. Id. at 764, 235 N.W.2d at 463.
120. The court stated: "The distinctive certificate that warns of possible undisclosed security interests, which is normally issued for vehicles with titles from other
states, does not negate the warranty. It merely offers a warning that a security interest
may exist, irrespective of the beliefs of the seller." Id. at 767, 235 N.W.2d at 464.
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Moreover, the court held that once the certificate of title is
passed the warranty provisions of chapter 342 of the Wisconsin
Statutes preclude the application of the Uniform Commercial
Code with respect to a warranty exclusion. The transfer of an
interest in an automobile may precede the conveyance of the
certificate, and under these circumstances the Uniform Commercial Code and its warranties would be applicable.'"' But
once the certificate of title is transferred, the Code no longer
applies and the seller is held to the warranty required by section 342.15(1).1' 1
This conclusion, while consonant with the intendment of
the Wisconsin Vehicle Code, nonetheless introduces the possibility of an automobile purchaser being left in the very situation the statute attempts to avoid. For example, if the title
certificate to the automobile is withheld by the seller even after
delivery of the automobile, the purchaser is protected only if
the seller's warranty of title under section 402.401 of the Commercial Code has not been modified or excluded.
DAvW B. BILLING

CRIMINAL JUSTICE
I. PRE-TRIAL STAGE
Since the decision was rendered, Hadley v. State' has been
used extensively to successfully argue denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial based on the Barker v. Wingo2 test.
Fosterv. State3 began the predictable trend to narrow the scope
of Hadley. In Foster,the defendant was arraigned on two felony
charges on April 26, 1971. Trial was set for May 27, 1971, but
was adjourned by stipulation, and the defendant specifically
121. Id. at 765, 235 N.W.2d at 463.
122. Id. at 766, 235 N.W.2d at 464.
1. 66 Wis. 2d 350, 225 N.W.2d 461 (1975).
2. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker the court noted that a defendant's constitutional
right to speedy trial can be determined only on an ad hoc basis in which the conduct
of the prosecution and the defendant are weighed and balanced. Among factors which
courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived
of his right are length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
3. 70 Wis. 2d 72, 233 N.W.2d 411 (1975).

